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ABSTRACT
Single-Sign-On (SSO) systems usage has been on the rise exponentially. One of
the major benefits of having an SSO system is to have a central authentication
service, which other applications can use. However, SSO services are also prone
to failure. If an SSO service becomes unavailable due to failure, every application
that uses the SSO service become simultaneously inaccessible to users. The goal
of this research is to explore a technique to mitigate the availability issue of the
SSO by customizing its functionality, and distributing its data using blockchain
technology over the network. The Blockchain data structure possesses inherent
properties that can be useful to improve an SSO service’s availability and hence,
its overall functionality and reliability.
viii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Applications are programs that help users to store, retrieve, and analyze data. As
organizations grow bigger and expand their scope of work, they need more appli-
cations to drive their daily operations [35]. These applications give users access
to information (private and public), such as financial data, customers’ data, etc.
Therefore, access to different applications has to be limited respectively to only
those authorized to access them [33]. Securing applications require an authentica-
tion mechanism that verifies the user’s identity before letting the user access these
applications. Authentication can take different forms, such as basic authentica-
tion, biometric authentication, etc. The most common method of authentication
is the basic one, where developers usually add a login page that challenges users to
provide a valid username and password [4, 10, 37]. This login page can be attached
to a developed resource to protect it. But, as the number of applications increases,
securing these applications will become a daunting task, not to mention maintain-
ing the authentication code in each of them. To alleviate this problem, developers
started to think of building a centralized solution that all applications could use [5],
which led to the development of the widely used SSO system [9, 13, 26, 42].
SSO brings many benefits to users. One of the major benefits is that the user
will only need to login once. After a successful sign-on in the SSO’s login page,
the user will have access to all applications connected to that SSO service and
without the need to log in again. In the same manner, when the user logs out from
any resource, he/she will also generally have the option to log out from all other
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applications via the SSO system.
Many organizations already have adopted the SSO system in their network.
SSO makes it easy for developers to secure many applications, and allows users to
memorize and use a single pair of username and password to access multiple ap-
plications instead of overwhelming them with several complex username/password
pairs. Besides, maintaining a single authentication application is more manage-
able than multiple ones. The benefits SSO systems encourage organizations not
yet using them to move towards using SSO systems. A major drawback in SSO
systems is they have a one point of failure [11]. This vulnerability can have ma-
jor adverse effects on organizations if the SSO stops working. If the SSO stops
working, users will not be able to access any of the secured applications that the
SSO manages. To the best of the author’s knowledge, little or no research in the
literature has reported or proposed a solution to this issue, which was one of the
primary motivations of this research.
Blockchain is a data structure designed and implemented in 2008 by an anony-
mous person or a group under the name Satoshi Nakamoto [40]. The purpose of
blockchain is to decentralize data and replicate them across different servers on the
network. As will be discussed later in detail, there are many implementations of
blockchain with the same goal. This research used a blockchain application called
Hyperledger - Fabric [2, 7]. Hyperledger - Fabric stores the data in a special data
stores called ledgers that are spread out on the network [39]. Blockchain stores
data in blocks, and each block contains various pieces of information (data) de-
pending on the specific application. Also, each block stores a cryptographic hash
of that block and a cryptographic hash of the previous block, forming a chain
of blocks, hence the name blockchain. Because of this strong link between the
blockchain blocks, blockchain’s datastores are resistant to modification, a feature
that made blockchain very popular and attractive. The techniques blockchain uses
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to decentralize data and store data, might help address the SSO one-point failure
vulnerability identified previously. The contributions of the research in this thesis
are: (1) To explore blockchain based techniques to improve availability of SSO sys-
tems, (2) Implement the proposed solution over two protocols, namely round-robin
and random, to balance the load of the authentication requests between multiple
servers.
The thesis is organized as follows. This first chapter (Chapter 1) provides an
introduction to the Singe-Sign-On system and Blockchain technology, the benefits
of using them and the proposed solution. Chapter 2 provides additional details
about blockchain components, applications, and configuration that the experiment
model used. Chapter 3 describes the implementation of the proposed solution and
also the test functions. Chapter 4 presents the results that have been collected
from the experiment and provides an analysis of the results. Finally, Chapter 5
states the conclusion from this work and presents observations that could expand
the scope of this work for future research.
1.1 Background
Securing data and applications that access these data have become a challenging
task. Attackers are becoming smarter every day, not to mention the advanced
tools they use that allow them to scan and attack systems. Unfortunately, appli-
cations that are meant to help administrators to test the security of their servers
and networks can also also be used by attackers to exploit systems. These appli-
cations are usually available on the Internet and any anyone can download and
use them. SSO can help improve the security of the system in two aspects. First,
it will provide a single authentication point that makes the maintainability of the
data and the code easier on administrators and developers. Second, it prevents
storing passwords in more than one place, or places external to the organization’s
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network [41].
Previous studies discussed the concept and the design of the SSO service. For
example, [5] and [21] talked in detail about the SSO protocol and the types of
applications it can support, such as Web SSO, Legacy SSO, and Federated SSO. It
also discussed the encryption techniques that could be implemented over an SSO
to protect data in communication against eavesdroppers who might be listening
to the communication. Besides, the paper [5] also talks about protocols that the
SSO could use, such as LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol), Kerberos,
RADIUS protocol, etc. for user authentication. With the growing popularity and
convenience of using cloud computing as a service in organizations, the paper [27]
suggests making the SSO a cloud service, and implementing the resulting central-
ized user authentication virtually. Only a few papers (e.g. [5, 21]) talk about some
of the issues with the SSO. As mentioned before, being a centralized service, SSO
has a single point of failure vulnerability. Therefore, if the server goes down, no
user can log in and use any of the resources on the network.
This research investigates the availability issue of the SSO and explores a solution
that can minimize the adverse impacts of this issue. Throughout this research work,
a new model will be built that implements the SSO and the suggested solution,
which then it will be tested and compared with the current used model. Some
of the questions that this research tries to answer are: (1) What are the possible
solutions to single-point failures in SSO? (2) Can blockchains be used as part of
the solution? (3) If yes, then how? (4) Would using blockchains add complexity
and/or latency to the model compared to other solutions? (5) If yes, then by how
much?
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1.2 Objectives of the SSO
The invention of the Single-Sign-On (SSO) service brought a lot of benefits that
helped developers resolve different issues that they experienced before. The SSO
got rid of code replication, since it provided a central authentication service that
all applications could use. Figure 1.1 shows the concept of the SSO in a network.
Figure 1.1: Single Sign On Concept
The benefits of using SSO as described in [41] are:
1. No need to store credentials and manage them externally when using a 3rd
party application.
2. SSO will liberate users from memorizing a complex password for each appli-
cation they access.
3. Users will have access to other applications once they authenticate success-
fully.
4. SSO will minimize the time spent on maintaining the authentication code
and data.
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1.3 The Proposed Solution to Single-Point Failure in SSO
SSO is a useful authentication system, yet and as explained in the previous section,
it has the vulnerability of a one-point failure. Therefore, if the SSO system stopped
working because of any reason, users will not be able to log in and/or access any
of the secured applications accessible via the SSO system. An intuitive way to
address this issue is to run multiple SSO systems any of which can authenticate
users, and let them access the secured applications on the network. Although this
might work, it might not be the optimal solution to address the problem. That is
because, with this solution, all SSO systems share the same database containing
user information. Therefore, the failure of the database engine also collapses the
whole system. Additionally, this solution might introduce latency if the database
and the SSO are located physically in different geographical locations. A better
solution will be to distribute and replicate the database across the network too. In
this research the usage of blockchain to replicate the database has been explored.
Blockchain aims to distribute data across multiple servers in the same or different
locations. The proposed solution to the one-point failure in SSO links SSO with
blockchain. Although usage of blockchain to replicate databases in SSOs might
add complexity to the overall system, it is still worthwhile finding out the amount
of complexity in terms of different parameters like latency, memory usage, energy
consumption, etc. This research implements the SSO system using blockchain
for data distribution and replication and compares it with the current state-of-
art SSO systems that use traditional Relation Based databases (RDBMS) to store
data and Structured Query Language (SQL) to retrieve data in terms of scalability,
maintainability, and vulnerability.
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CHAPTER 2
Blockchain Technology
2.1 Introduction to Blockchain
A blockchain is a linked list of records constructed in blocks in which blocks are
linked together cryptographically via a hash function [39]. Blockchain stores data
using key-value pairs. In blockchains, the record’s value does not change. Instead,
a new record (block) is appended to the blockchain whenever existing data has to
be modified. This behavior can be useful for checking the history of updates on a
piece of data contained in the blockchain. Each block in the blockchain contains
a cryptographic hash value of the data in that block that depends on the cryp-
tographic hash of the previous block, making data in blocks almost impossible to
be altered. One has to modify the hash of all the blocks following a particular
block in a blockchain if data of this block has to be modified. These blocks are
stored in multiple locations (called ledgers in blockchain terminology) to form a
distributed ledgers network. Before adding any block to the ledger, the request
goes through different processes, depending on the application. The processes help
to make sure that the request is valid, and the blockchain nodes are in consensus
with that request before processing it. Blockchain nodes check the identity of the
requester by checking the requester’s digital signature attached to the request.
Once blockchain’s initial validation completes, the consensus process starts. The
consensus protocol may again differ, depending on the blockchain application [45].
Bitcoin, for example, uses Proof of Work (PoW) protocol [18], while Ethereum uses
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Proof of Stake (PoS) [14] consensus protocol. More sophisticated consensus algo-
rithms such as Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [1] are also available
in certain blockchain applications. Some blockchain applications offer more than
one consensus protocol. Each network environment may need different blockchain
applications depending on the intended use and the consensus protocol desired.
Therefore, the decision-maker will have to examine the network and study the
advantages and disadvantages of each consensus protocol to decide on blockchain
application that will fit the environment the best.
Blockchain can be categorized into two categories: permissionless and permis-
sioned applications [8, 22, 43, 44]. Permissionless blockchain networks are open
for anyone to participate in using the blockchain’s functionalities by making the
participant’s server(s) be a part of the blockchain network. Common examples of
permisionless blockchains are Bitcoin and Ethereum [38]. On the other hand, only
agreed upon participants can be a part of the blockchain network in permissioned
blockchain applications. This agreement has to be decided on before setting up
the blockchain network. An example of permissioned blockchain application is
Hyperledger Fabric [2], which is what this research uses.
2.2 Blockchain Applications
As mentioned in the previous section, in the permissionless blockchain, anyone can
participate in the blockchain network. The participation happens at the consensus
stage and will differ by the consensus algorithm adopted by the blockchain appli-
cation. For example, in PoW (Proof of Work) protocol, the blockchain network
asks the participants to solve a cryptographic puzzle. Participant servers will race
each other to solve this puzzle. The incentive for these participants on the race
is that the first participant who solves the problem will win a reward from the
blockchain system. This process is called mining in blockchain, and the miners are
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nodes/servers that solve the puzzle [23]. PoS (Proof of Stake), on the other hand,
realizes the power consumption issue in solving a complex mathematical problem
when using PoW. Instead, PoS motivates participants to buy cryptocurrency to
become a more competitive stakeholder and validator.
In permissioned blockchain system, participants are already known by the
blockchain network and agreed upon at the early stages of building the network.
Communications in permissioned blockchain networks are strict. Therefore, par-
ticipants that send a message will have to stamp it with their digital signature.
Also, any participant that receives a message will verify the digital stamp of the
sender before processing the message. The receiving participant will ignore the
message if it fails to verify the signature. In other words, the message will fail the
receiving participant’s verification if it is coming from a non-participant server, or
if its cryptographic signature does not match the sender’s signature. All partici-
pant servers in this scenario know each other and share the same goal. Because the
identities of all participants are known, the risk of having a malicious participant
that tries to disrupt the blockchain system is less. Also it is easier to identify the
a malicious or compromised node/server in this type of blockchain networks.
The properties of the Hyperledger Fabric, such as its robustness, fit most of the
requirements of an SSO system. Also, Hyperledger being a permissioned blockchain
application makes it more desirable for storing private information such as users’
account information that an SSO system uses. Additionally, Hyperledger Fabric is
an open source, permissioned distributed ledger blockchain that addresses certain
limitations of other permissioned blockchain systems, e.g. usage of a fixed con-
sensus protocol, and not having flexibility in the programming language used for
implementation [3]. It was created under the Linux Foundation, and is intended
to be used in enterprise systems. Also, Hyperledger Fabric was designed to be
modular and configurable, a feature that fits in nicely for SSO systems.
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2.3 Hyperledger Fabric Componenets
The main components of Hyperledger Fabric (or Fabric) include ledger(s), peer(s),
smart contracts, and orderer(s). Fabric modularizes the network by using contain-
ers, and therefore, Fabric has Orderer(s) and Peer(s) in separate docker containers.
Ledgers are Fabric’s immutable storage units that do not only store the current
record’s value but also store the transaction history for each record. Each record
is stored in the form of blocks, and the data in the blocks are in key-value pairs.
Because each block references the previous block’s cryptographical hash, it is al-
most impossible to alter any record. Ledgers live in peers, and each peer can have
one or more ledgers. Peers are vital and fundamental components in the Fabric
network because they host ledgers and smart contracts, in addition to their role in
endorsing and validating new requests.
Smart contracts (also known as chaincodes) are applications that define the
policies among the participating entities on the blockchain network [34]. Fab-
ric supports different languages that can be used to develop the chaincode, such
as Golang, Java, and Nodejs. Chaincode applications set the behaviors of the
blockchain network, such as creating a new record, updating records, deleting
records, etc. in addition to maintaining the requirements to initialize any request.
Orderers, on the other hand, plays a critical role in collecting and ordering new
blocks before distributing them to the peer nodes. Indeed, in Fabric, no single
commit to the ledger can be done without orderer’s involvement in the process.
Generally, if the network receives a request to add a record to the ledger, this re-
quest will go through a process. This process comprises of three phases: proposal
phase, ordering and packaging transactions into blocks phase, and validation and
commits stage. In the proposal phase, the application (which is not part of the
blockchain network, but it interfaces with it) will issue a transaction request to
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each of the required peers for endorsements. The endorsing peers will check the
received request and digitally sign it, yet they do not update their ledgers at this
phase. Once the peer approves the request, it returns to the application, and that
will mark the completion of the first phase. In the second phase, the system will
package and send the signed transactions it received from the endorsed peers to the
orderer, which is the pivotal component in the update process. The third phase of
the process involves the orderer to distribute the signed request to all peers that
will validate the claim and ensure the appropriate organization has endorsed the
request before committing the update to the ledger. Because Fabric is a permis-
sioned blockchain, each participating peer must have a cryptographic key that it
can use to sign requests. Other peers will check the signature of these requests to
verify who worked on these requests. If the verification of any message points to
a foreign sender, the peer will ignore these requests. The Fabric also implements
different permissions within one network by introducing channels to the system.
For peers to communicate with each other, they need to be on the same channel.
Otherwise, they are not authorized to talk. Peers can join organizations. Depend-
ing on the endorsement policy, peers from different organizations might have to
endorse a transaction to make sure all organizations are in agreement with any
transaction that occurs in the blockchain network.
2.4 Initial Setup for this Project
The initial research was to build a working Fabric network following the tutorials
that [3] provided in Building Your First Network and in the Fabcar tutorial. In
the examples illustrated, two organizations have been configured with two peers in
each of them. A channel that connects all peers and one orderer has been set up in
a single machine. A sample chaincode has also been provided to demonstrate the
functionality of the blockchain. Another Fabric componenet (cli) has been installed
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to be used to communicate with peers and the orderer. Each blockchain component
(Peers, orderer, and the cli) resided in a docker container. These components could
communicate with each other, although each resided in separate docker containers.
Major non-trivial modification on the above setup has been carried out to fit it
in the current research model of this thesis. In the above setup, the entire process,
including initiating the ledger, adding, updating, or querying it, was carried out
manually. This requires executing numerous commands in the cli bash terminal,
for example to pull data from the ledger or write to the ledger. A further issue with
the setup model is that it uses a single machine to set up all blockchain components,
which does not reflect a real-world scenario. Thus, an important modification of
the existing setup carried out in the research was the separation of each Fabric
component into its own server achieved without disrupting the communication
between them in the network.
2.4.1 Blockchain Setup Details
The blockchain network in the new model that was created for experiments con-
tained an orderer on a machine and two peers, each residing on a Linux server.
The chaincode provided in [6] has been modified and extended in functionality to
add update and delete methods. Also, the method’s signatures of the chaincode
have been modified to better fit the experiments’ requirement. The experiments
required an application to act as middleware between the blockchain network and
applications external to the blockchain network. The implemented application ex-
poses APIs, enabling other applications to interact with the blockchain through
these APIs. Fabric’s SDK library has been used to build this application. The
Fabric SDK supports two programming languages: Java and NodeJS, and future
versions are likely to support more programming languages. The NodeJS SDK
has been used to develop the APIs for this research. Figure 2.1 summarizes the
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blockchain network used in the experiment.
Figure 2.1: Implemented Blockchain Model
In this setup, an organization called org1 has been created having two peers:
Peer0 and Peer1. Also, a single channel called mychannel was created and joined
to Peer0 and Peer1. One orderer that used the Solo consensus protocol has been
installed for simplicity. To set up the blockchain system, we used a Fabric config-
uration file called configtx.yaml. We also used configtxgen tool, which came with
Hyperledger Fabric, to generate the cryptographic keys for each Fabric’s compo-
nent. This tool receives the necessary configuration information from a file called
crypt-config.yaml to create necessary cryptographic keys.
The new blockchain network model described above allowed isolating each
blockchain component from the rest by hosting it in a separate server. This iso-
lation helped place blockchain nodes in different geolocation maintaining func-
tionality at the same time. Moving nodes to different locations will improve the
distrubitiveness and hence availability of the service. A query can potentially be
– 13 –
directed to any peer in the network based on efficiency, improving overall network
performance. Furthermore, having blockchain APIs on the network, enables other
applications to interface with the blockchain network in an automated fashion,
without the need for any manual labor to query or update the ledgers.
2.5 Implementation of Final Model
To be able to isolate each blockchain component and install it in a separate server,
network connectivity should be maintained among the hosting servers. All servers
were put on the same networking subnet in order to achieve that. The servers had
following IP addresses:
• The server that hosts the Orderer: 192.168.1.185
• The server that hosts Peer0: 192.168.1.106
• The server that hosts Peer1: 192.168.1.126
As mentioned before, Fabric was built using docker containers. Each container
has a Fabric component installed in it, and each docker container uses a network
of its own but communicates with the hosting network. For the experiment, Fabric
components the following domains with the respective IP addresses have been as-
signed. The docker configuration file docker-compose.yml is where the container’s
network can be set. The following settings for domains were set the file (/etc/hosts)
of the hosting server:
• Orderer: 192.168.16.2 orderer.example.com
• Peer0: 192.168.17.3 peer0.org1.example.com
• Peer1: 192.168.18.4 peer1.org1.example.com
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To enable the communication between Fabric components, we also added routes
on each server, such that, the hosting operating system will know where to route
the network packets to. These new routes were as follow:
On Orderer hosting server:
ip route add 192.168.17.0/24 via 192.168.1.106 dev enp0s3
ip route add 192.168.18.0/24 via 192.168.1.126 dev enp0s3
On Peer0 hosting server:
ip route add 192.168.18.0/24 via 192.168.1.126 dev enp0s3
ip route add 192.168.16.0/24 via 192.168.1.185 dev enp0s3
on Peer1 hosting server:
ip route add 192.168.17.0/24 via 192.168.1.106 dev enp0s3
ip route add 192.168.16.0/24 via 192.168.1.185 dev enp0s3
We used the Orderer hosting server to create the initial blockchain setup. That
is, defining blockchain’s component(s), organization(s), domain(s) and the chan-
nel(s) using "configtx.yaml" file that Fabric tool "configtxgen" will consume when
we run that tool. Running "configtxgen" tool will create two files: channel.tx and
genesis.block. These two files play an important role as we will use them when
creating the channel and when joining the peers to the channel in the network.
We also used the Orderer hosting server to generate the necessary cryptographic
keys using "crypt-config.yaml" config file and "configtxgen" tool. For this experi-
ment, the blockchain is set up not to encrypt any data transferred through the line
between blockchain components. We also did not use any encryption on the appli-
cation that uses the Fabric SDK to expose the blockchain APIs. We programmed
the APIs to either read from blockchain, write to it, update it, or delete from it.
Of course, updating or deleting any record in blockchain means to add another
record that reflects the new value to the key in the ledger. The URLs for these
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APIs are:
peer ip address:8080/write?req=update&name=VALUE1&value=VALUE2 - for
writing/update to blockchain
peer ip address:8080/write/?req=create&name=VALUE1&value=VALUE2 - for
writing/create to blockchain
peer ip address:8080/write/?req=delete&name=VALUE1 - for writing/delete from
blockchain
peer ip address:8080//get?req=VALUE1 - for reading from blockchain,
where VALUE1/VALUE2 is the key/value pair for each record.
Now that we have installed and configured the blockchain application and set
up its network, we are ready to move on to the next step and start working on the
SSO application. Hence, in the next chapter, we will be talking about the imple-
mentation of the SSO concept and how it communicates and use the blockchain
network. Furthermore, we will discuss the mechanism that we implemented and
investigate the performance of the different protocol options that we have devel-
oped.
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CHAPTER 3
Implementation Details
3.1 Requirements for the Model
Two options were considered to build the SSO model. The first one was to use
an opensource application and customize it to make it fit the research needs. The
second option was to develop the concept from scratch. While both options were
feasible, since building the SSO model from scratch makes customizing it easier,
this option was selected. Also, implementing the SSO made it easier to plug it
into the blockchain network in addition to the traditional database storage. When
developing the SSO, several testing functions have been added to measure different
properties of the system. Appending these functions to a previously developed SSO
application, would have been a challenge.
The developed SSO model and system provides following features that any
traditional SSO application offers:
1. Single login web application.
2. A user can access any resource that uses the SSO service upon login.
3. A user is logged out from all resources upon logout of the SSO service.
Additionally, since this model supports multiple SSO servers, the following re-
quirements were added:
1. Almost identical login web page.
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2. A user logged in from either servers will have access to any resource that uses
the SSO service.
3. Before redirecting the user to an SSO server, the model checks the availability
of the server first. If none of the servers are available, it shows an error
message, asking the user to try again later.
Additionally, a few APIs were published for use on the new model. For ex-
ample an API used for logging in and out a test user. The experiment used the
automated authentication process to examine the new model’s performance when
using blockchain and when using the traditional (SQL) database.
3.2 Concept Implementation
The new SSO model comprises of two main servers: 1) Identity Provider (Idp)
server and 2) the Decision-Making (DM) server. Usually, with traditional SSO
applications, there are two main servers: Idp server and the Service Provider (SP)
server [12]. Idp server is similar in functionality on both models: the current model
and the traditional one. Idp’s main goal is to provide the user with a login page,
authenticate the user then redirect them back to the resource that the user was
trying to access. On the other hand, the DM server is similar in functionality to
the SP server. However, more functions have been added to the DM server on
top of an SP server, to fit it with the experiment needs. The DM server will be
responsible for receiving the initial request from the resource, and checks Idp’s
availability and redirect the user accordingly. The DM’s role is vital to the whole
system as it plays as the mediator between the resource and the Idp. Therefore,
all messages that originate from the applications will run through the DM to the
designated Idp. The applications which are using the SSO will send their url to the
DM server, which in turn send the url to the Idp. The Idp will use the received url
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to redirect the user back to the application that the user was trying to access. The
application will attach its url to other servers using a query string parameter via
GET method. However, checking the availability of the Idps is handled by querying
the Idp status using the POST method. Checking the availability of the Idp will
also check the availability of the blockchain network too.
The Idp, on the other hand, exposes other APIs that serve other purposes.
These APIs are built to implement the test environment. To make the experiment
simple, no security concept has been applied when developing these APIs. There-
fore, servers traverse messages in plain text, with no message integrity validation
nor encryption. Depending on what the user chooses, the Idp will either interact
with the blockchain network or the database. The DM server will check which Idp
is available first, and then it will check the availability of the storage method that
the user has selected (blockchain or database). Depending on the outcome of the
check, the application will redirect the user to an Idp and at the same time ask the
Idp to use the available storage method. A checkbox has been added to the login
page to make the user be able to enforce the Idp to use either storage method. The
communication to the database or blockchain is seamless to the log in process and
the user. If the login page has a ticked checkbox, then the Idp uses the database.
Otherwise, The Idp will use blockchain instead. Fig. 3.1) provides a screenshot of
the login interface.
3.3 Test Model
After implementing the main concept of the SSO and connecting it to the blockchain
and the database, the need was to develop another function that tests the perfor-
mance when using either storage method (blockchain vs. traditional database).
The requirement for this function is that it must be able to calculate (as accu-
rately as possible) the time taken to log a user in. Also, it must be able to receive
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Figure 3.1: Single Sign On Login Page
and information about the Idp’s CPU usage and memory usage in each login cycle.
Round Robin and Random distribution protocols have been used to distribute the
load between the two Idps in the test model. In Round Robin, the requests alter-
nate between the first Idp and the second one, while Random forwards requests to
an Idp randomly. As shown in Fig. 3.2, storage method selection and number of
iterations that the application will log the test user in and out, have been added.
Each time the application logs a user in, it collects information about the time
taken by the application to visit the necessary pages back and forth. It also checks
which server was used, the CPU and the memory usage respectively for that server.
The test application then stores gathered information in a database for later pro-
cessing. Once the application completes all requested iterations, it shows results at
the bottom. The results displayed for time taken, CPU and memory usage are the
average of all collected data from all iterations. While the numbers below Server
A and Server B fields indicate how many times each server has served the request
for each test cycle. Fig. 3.2 summarizes this mechanism.
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The applications that pertain to the SSO implementation and testing, were
developed using ASP .NET, using .NET framework libraries version 4.6.1. On
the other hand, all web sites were developed using Microsoft Internet Information
Services (IIS) version 10. The database engine used was Microsoft SQL Server
2017. The experiment used two machines to implement the blockchain and the
SSO concept. Each of these machines has IIS, and MS SQL servers installed. The
next section will talk about the details of the hardware of each machine and what
each machine hosts.
Figure 3.2: Implementation of the Test Page
3.4 Hardware Used
Two machines were used to implement and run the experiment. The first machine
has the following specification:
• Type: Desktop
• Model: Dell Optiplex 760
• CPU: Intel (R) Core (TM)2 Duo CPU E8400 @ 3.00 GHz
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• Memory: 4GB
• Network card: Intel(R) 82567LM-3 Gigabit Network Connection
The other machine’s specification is as follow:
• Type: Laptop
• Model: Dell G3 15
• CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-8300H CPU @ 2.30 GHz
• Memory: 8 GB
• Network card: Realtek PCIe GbE Family Controller
Three virtual machines were used, which were installed in the desktop machine
(Dell Optiplex 760). All virtual machines have the same the specification, and
they are as follow:
• Type: Virtual Machine
• Model: n/a
• Virtual CPU: 1 CPU with an execution cap of 50% of the host’s CPU
• Virtual Memory: 500 MB
• Virtual Network card: Intel (R) 82567LM-3 Gigabit Network Connection
3.5 Operating System and Software Used
The laptop machine has Microsoft Windows 10 version 1803. The Desktop ma-
chine has Microsoft Windows 10 operating system. The desktop computer has
a virtual machine application (virtualbox) installed on it, that runs three Linux
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server - Debian distribution, that host the blockchain components. The first vir-
tual machine is the Orderer, the second is the first peer (Peer0), and the third is
the second peer (Peer1).
Each Linux server has the following software:
• Nodejs version 8.9.4
• Docker and Docker CE version 18.09.3
• Blockchain application version 1.4
• npm version 5.6.0
• Go version 1.11.5
Each Windows operating system has the following software:
• Internet Information System
• Microsoft SQL Server 2017
• Web Browser
• .Net Framework library
3.6 Putting All Pieces Together
Multiple applications were needed to run the experiment. The first two applications
are the resources that the user will try to access. The following domain names were
assigned to them in the IIS server:
• a.resource.local
• b.resource.local
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The other two applications were the login applications. The following domain
names were assigned:
• a.idp.local
• b.idp.local
Another two applications have been developed to control the redirection of the
authentication requests. The domain names for theses are:
• a.dm.local
• b.dm.local
Figure 3.3: How the hardware are connected
Lastly, and to be able to test the whole login cycle and check the system per-
formance, another application has been developed and the following domain was
given to it:
• testpage.local
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The IIS that hosts the resource applications, as well as the test page is installed
on the laptop computer and has the IP address of 192.168.1.109. The rest of
the applications are hosted on the Desktop machine’s IIS with an IP address of
192.168.1.119. Fig. 3.3 shows how servers are interconnected with each other.
This connection setup serves simplicity and enhances availability. In production
networks, each vital component of this network could be installed in different
hardware that could be placed in different locations for better availability.
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CHAPTER 4
Results and Analysis
4.1 Results
Two systems have been compared in the experiments. An SSO whose database
has been built over a blockchain, and an SSO with a traditional relational (SQL)
database. Additionally the latter case has been further subdivided into having a
single SSO controlling (traditional) the SQL database versus two SSO’s controlling
the SQL database (non-traditional). The test model has been made to record two
seconds of response time to reflect failure when the SSO service is unreachable.
To summarize the results before detailed analysis in the next section, Tables 4.1,
4.2, and 4.3 can be compared. Higher response time of the blockchain based system
(Table 4.1) over the SQL database based system with two SSO’s (non-traditional,
Table 4.3) is noted. However, when using only one SSO, the SQL database based
system records considerable higher response times (traditional, Table 4.2) than
the blockchain based system. A similar analysis can be done with Tables 4.4, 4.5
and 4.6. This signifies, blockchain add latency (overhead), but make the SSO much
resistant against failures and thus mitigates the one-point failure problem.
4.2 Analysis
From the three result sets, one can right away say that the best-gotten result set was
the non-traditional database network. The average performance, CPU usage, and
memory usage were: 157.575ms, 2.37%, and 83.54%, respectively, when using the
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Server A Server B Avg Response Time (ms) CPU Usage % Memory Usage %
50 50 306.57 2.030681506 83.5248911
50 50 291.69 1.830287921 83.5652267
50 50 292.15 2.014770745 83.6936236
50 50 282.92 2.243154846 83.8098388
50 50 332.2 2.025063038 84.0343197
50 50 340.51 1.917625142 83.6562479
Average 307.6733333 2.010263866 83.71402463
Table 4.1: Using Blockchain with 100 iterations and
Round Robin decision making policy
Server A Server B Avg Response Time (ms) CPU Usage % Memory Usage %
50 50 1087.21 61.9286201 92.6003759
50 50 1091.54 62.3675979 92.7597692
50 50 1085.31 63.3199594 92.7486049
50 50 1086.87 60.69951788 92.4283692
50 50 1083.07 52.48020791 91.283737
50 50 1088.87 51.29524499 91.3197853
Average 1087.145 58.68185803 92.19010692
Table 4.2: Using Database with 100 iterations and Round Robin
decision making policy - traditional connection
Server A Server B Avg Response Time (ms) CPU Usage % Memory Usage %
50 50 163.35 2.567436978 83.5435908
50 50 154.31 2.41905589 83.5693876
50 50 163.33 1.758625627 83.5748293
50 50 158.78 2.566913101 83.5276352
50 50 155.9 2.212149397 83.4983903
50 50 149.78 2.711715433 83.5528293
Average 157.575 2.372649404 83.54444375
Table 4.3: Using Database with 100 iterations and Round Robin
decision making policy - Non-traditional connection
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Server A Server B Avg Response Time (ms) CPU Usage % Memory Usage %
56 44 350.43 5.459260341 83.5454013
57 43 315.8 1.972614039 82.9586011
57 43 312.31 1.954636692 82.9663439
37 63 352.33 1.912760897 83.0211267
50 50 310.1 1.870752326 83.0373443
37 63 314.36 2.222285752 83.0883875
Average 325.8883333 2.565385008 83.10286747
Table 4.4: Using Blockchain with 100 iterations and Random
decision making policy
Server A Server B Avg Response Time (ms) CPU Usage % Memory Usage %
48 52 1126.12 52.96215045 91.6951103
51 49 1073.69 51.23559325 91.2148014
60 40 894.28 41.36450123 89.6292268
52 48 1047.08 49.50005645 91.0233381
47 53 1136.39 54.45525725 91.9794858
53 47 1022.82 48.37765522 90.9149873
Average 1050.063333 49.64920231 91.07615828
Table 4.5: Using Database with 100 iterations and Random decision making
policy - traditional connection
Server A Server B Avg Response Time (ms) CPU Usage % Memory Usage %
51 49 154.93 2.777926719 83.10634
46 54 159.52 2.844795191 83.0365255
48 52 152.44 2.936936071 82.9861402
50 50 150.3 2.856918992 83.0430471
57 43 155.68 2.73933416 83.0164671
46 54 154.36 2.620824055 82.9637084
Average 154.5383333 2.796122531 83.02537138
Table 4.6: Using Database with 100 iterations and Random decision making
policy - Non-traditional connection
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round-robin protocol. The average performance, CPU usage, and memory usage
were: 154.53ms, 2.79%, 83.02%, respectively, when using the random protocol.
This model is quite unrealistic, and the reason for that is because this model does
not provide a failover solution to the database. Also, in this scenario, if the two
SSO servers are far away from each other, the system will introduce latency and
delay, based on the location of the database to each server.
The blockchain was the second-best model in performance. This model result’s
average for performance, CPU usage, and memory was: 307.67ms, 2.01%, and
83.71%, respectively, when using the round-robin protocol, while it was 325.88ms,
2.56%, and 83.10% respectively when using the random protocol.
It was no surprise that the performance for the model that used the database
in a traditional connection was the worst. In this layout, the database was in-
terfacing with only one server, and hence, users were not able to use the second
server. To show this failure in our experiment, the SSO network was made to
return (2) seconds delay, 100% CPU usage, and 100% memory usage each time the
application tried to use the second server. Therefore, the average results for this
model’s performance, CPU usage, and memory usage were: 1087.14ms, 58.68%,
and 92.19%, respectively, when using the round-robin protocol. Using random
protocol, the performance, CPU usage, and memory usage for the model were:
1050.06ms, 49.64%, and 91.07%, respectively.
As can be noticed from the results, using blockchain network added overhead
to the process, which is what the time response and the memory usage indicated.
The model with blockchain was slower in response and higher in memory usage
compared to the non-traditional database model. Surprisingly, the CPU usage
was less in the blockchain model than the non-traditional one. Blockchain model
needed about 2.01% of the available CPU power while the database model needed
2.37% when using Round Robin protocol. One can see the same observation when
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looking at the results of the two models that use the random protocol. It’s worth
mentioning that the memory and CPU usage stats were for the desktop machine
that hosts the blockchain network as well as the SQL server.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and future work
5.1 Conclusion
Throughout the experiment, it has been noticed that using a non-traditional
database network was the fastest and the least resource-demanding compared to
other models. However, if the database server malfunctioned or disconnected from
the rest of the system, the solution will fall apart. Therefore, this model has one
critical point of failure, which makes it unrealistic in practical implementations.
Also, attacks to the database servers are becoming popular, and attacking web
applications using SQL injections increased significantly in the last decade, which
is another drawback of using databases.
SQL injection attack is one of the most dangerous web application attacks
and the most common and notorious attack on the databases [24]. This attack
aims to steal private information or delete data from the database by exploiting
the vulnerabilities in a web application. These vulnerabilities are associated with
improper validation and sanitization to the data received from untrusted input.
Web application attacks, including SQL injection attacks, were at the top of the
list by many organizations such as WASP, MITRE, etc. The attacker will try
to insert SQL statements as input to the page’s input fields, hoping that the
application will include them in its SQL queries. A successful attack can give the
attacker access to the application’s database and allow the attacker to alter the
stored data [19]. Using databases comes with the risk of getting such attacks in
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addition to other attacks as illustrated in [15, 16, 17, 20, 25, 28, 30, 31, 29, 32, 36].
On the other hand, the blockchain network offered benefits that the database
did not provide. Security is a big concern when using databases. A simple program-
ming issue could lead to a catastrophic problem, giving the attacker the leverage
to alter data. As we discussed above, SQL Injection is the most common and no-
torious attack against web applications. Even after many years of discovering this
exploit, there are still many web applications that are vulnerable to this attack.
Using blockchain will eliminate the SQL Injection exploitation because blockchain
uses a different approach to query the datastores. Also, as it was discussed in
previous sections, any request to the blockchain will go through many verifications
and validations before the blockchain network processes that request. Blockchain
can distribute the data in multiple servers that can be in different geolocation,
which is a nice feature to have, especially in the availability problem. If database
networks are to be modified to implement the same features that blockchain offers,
overhead and complexity will be added to the system. Besides, it will be putting
lots of effort into implementing features that come by default with blockchain.
Blockchain, however, comes with a caveat, with the same feature that lever-
ages blockchain over the database. This issue is the inability of deleting records.
Therefore, attackers could flood the blockchain network with many requests to
create new accounts, update accounts, or even reset the account’s password. This
behavior will make the blockchain storage overgrow, and when blockchain uses all
available space, the blockchain functionality will break. The backup process is also
not a straight forward process when it comes to blockchain, contrary to its peer,
the backup process for the database is quite easy.
In any problem, there will be more than one solution. Each solution will fit
a specific situation. However, any solution that will be decided on, there will be
things that will be compromised. This research shed some light on a problem and
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explored a solution that uses blockchain and compared it with a solution that uses
the traditional and non-traditional database networks. The research also provided
advantages and disadvantages of using each solution over the other in the hope
that developers consider the weaknesses of each solution and try to address them
to build a better model.
5.2 Future Work
Using a blockchain network has helped to solve the research problem, but it also in-
troduced security vulnerabilities to the system, as mentioned in the above sections.
To improve upon the proposed solution, one can investigate ways to mitigate the
security vulnerabilities that were introduced by using blockchain. Also, backing
up the blockchain data and archiving its old data are another avenue to explore.
Enhancing the model’s security and solving the backup and archive problems will
help make the use of blockchain more practical in SSO applications and to similar
applications to SSO as well. Also, finding an algorithm that speed up the read-
/write time with blockchain networks will always be a good subject to study on to
bring the blockchain applications to the next level.
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